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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Partnership composed
of ,V. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W.
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P.
NEILSON,
Plaintiff:..Respondent~

Case No.
9622

vs.
JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE,
his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

'STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
'The Plaintiff seeks to vitiate a restrictive covenant
contained in a Quit-Claim Deed and Assignment of
Contract.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The _case: was tried to the Court. From a. judgment
by the District Court for Plaintiff, Defendants appeal.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL.
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts is characterized by
misinterpretation of the evidence and unwarranted inferences. We therefore deem it necessary to restate the
facts.
THE FACTS
The property in question is a parcel 40 feet wide
and 97 feet deep. The 40 feet constitute frontage on
the North side of North Temple Street, approximately
141.5 feet West of the Northwest corner of the intersection of North Temple and· 2nd West Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah (Exhibits 1, 5, and 9).
Prior to September 22, 1960, this property was
owned by one Steleanos E. Fendrelakis. Jerry Sine
and Dora T. Sine, his wife, by Assignment of Contract,
acquired an interest in the subject property as contract
buyers on September 24, 1955 (Exhibit 7). This property contained an antiquated apartment house remodeled from an older home, containing approximately
8 units (R. 106 and 110).
On October 29, 1956, the subject property was
sold to A. P. Nielson for $16,500.00 by the Appellants
Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife. This transaction
consisted of a Quit-Claim Deed executed by the said
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Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, in favor of A. P.
Neilson and an assignment of the Fendrelakis contract
(R. 106 and Exhibits 7 and 1) . The Quit-Claim Deed
and Assignment of Contract contained the following
notation: "This property shall not be used for the erection of a motel thereon" (Exhibits 1 and 7) .
On November 5, 1956, A. P. Neilson and Lillie
M. Neilson, his wife, conveyed to W. Adrian Wright
and Edna S. Wright, his wife, an undivided one-third
interest, and W. Meeks ·wirthlin and Betty J o G.
Wirthlin, his wife, an undivided one-third interest in
the subject property (Exhibit 2 and R. 13).
On November 21, 1956, the property was again
conveyed by A. P. Neilson and Lillie M. Neilson, his
wife, W. Adrian Wright and Edna S. Wright, his
wife, and W. Meeks Wirthlin and Betty JoG. Wirth..
lin, his wife, to the Metropolitan Investment Company,
a Co-Partnership consisting of W. Adrian Wright,
W. Meeks Wirthlin, and A. P. Neilson (Exhibit 4,

R. 13).
By .Warranty Deed dated September 22, 1960,
the fee owner of the subject property, Steleanos E.
Fendrelakis, conveyed the subject property to the
Metropolitan Investment Company (Exhibit 3, R. 13) .
Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, are partners
who have engaged in the motel business for approximately 14 years (R. 96}. They operate two motels,
one known as the Se Rancho Motor Lodge at 640 West

3
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North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, approximately 3 blocks West of the property in question, and
Scotty's Romney Motel located on North Temple
Street, between 6th and 7th West, Salt Lake City,
Utah, approximately 4 blocks west of the subject property ( R .. 63 and 67) . Said properties also being separated from the subject property by the Salt Lake
viaduct and railroad tracks ( R. 33 and 54) .
At the time of the purchase of the subject property, A. P. Neilson did not contemplate the construction
of a motel thereon ( R. 22) , nor did the partnership,
Metropolitan Investment Company, which later acquired title (R. 47).
Mr. Sine testified that the purchase of this property
from Mr. Fendrelakis was for the purpose of preventing a motel from being constructed upon the property
between 2nd and 3rd ':Vest Streets, Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68, and 70). He further
testified that the property was not large enough to be
of any real value as a motel site (R. 52), and that the
most it would accommodate as a motel would be 3 or 4
or 5 units (R. 69), and that, in fact, the construction
of 6 motel units upon the property would not materially
affect his motel business or other property holdings
(R. 96).
Western Travel, Inc., a corporation engaged in
the motel business, which acquired the subject property by Agreement dated September 30, 1960, (Exhibit
10), plans to construct upon its own properties sur4
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rounding the subject property, a motel development
of approximately 130 units, together with restaurant
and swimming pool, and if the subject property can be
utilized as part of this development, the number of
units would be increased by approximately 6 (R. 73,
74, and 75). Said corporation intends to construct a
motel upon the properties surrounding the subject
property regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. The
subject property is of such a nature as to prevent the
optimum use of the adjoining properties owned by
Western Travel, Inc., and constitutes a peninsula 40
feet by 97 feet into the properties of Western Travel,
Inc., that Is to be utilized as a motel (R. 82, 84, and 85).
In 1956, the structures located upon the subject
property were old, dilapidated, and in a tenement type
of· neighborhood and were in dire need of repair and
difficult to keep rented (R. 34, 109, 110). Also, in
October, 1956, the property was zoned B-3, which is
limited commercial property suitable for motel and
general commercial business (R. 36), and within a
radius of 2 blocks of the subject property there existed
4 motels as follows: Ruth Motel: 12 units; Western
Motel: 29 units; Covered Wagon Motel: 32 units ; and
Temple Motel: 1~ units, for a total of 91 motel units.
The balance of the neighborhood consisted of relatively
old homes converted into apartments and commercial
establishments ( R. 27 and 28) .
From October, 1956, to date of trial, December 1,
1956, there had been constructed within the same area

5
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described above the following: Harman Cafe; Utah
Motor Lodge: 156 units; City Center Motel: 26 units;
Travel Lodge Motel: 55 units; Travel Lodge: 52 units;
and Townhouse Motel: 48 units, an increase of 337
motel units or 470lj'o (R. 29, 30, 31). Also, there has
been other new construction in the vicinity of the subject, property including service stations, parking lots,
and the removal of old, antiquated buildings (R. 31
and 32).
Western Travel, Inc., purchased the properties
of Metropolitan Investment Company surrounding and
including the subject property, for the sum of $200,000.00, for which they agreed to pay cash and 105,000
shares of the capital stock of said corporation, of a par
value of $1.00 per share, to the partners, A. P. Neilson,
W. Adrian Wright, and W. Meeks Wirthlin, 35,000
shares to each of said parties, (R. 37, 38, 83, and Exhibit 10) the amount of stock received by the partners,
A. P. Neilson, W. Adrian Wright, and W. Meeks
Wirthlin being less than 12lj'o of the outstanding stock
of said Western Travel, Inc., and none of said partners
being officers or directors of said corporation (R. 83
and 84).

POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING

6
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(NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956,
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE SAID
RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
HOWEVER, SUCH A FINDING WAS NOT
NECESSARY TO THE CONCLUSION
REACHED BY THE COURT AND THAT
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THE
RESTRICTION VOIDABLE.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
THAT MR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPELLANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHT
WHATSOEVER IN THE PROPERTY IS
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND
THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO.
7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING
(NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956,
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBORI-IOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The witness, W. Meeks Wirthlin, testified that he
has been a real estate salesman since 1946 and a real
estate broker since 1948, and fl1rther testified that he
has been engag~d in the purchase and sale of property
and various business investment transactions in the
State of Utah since 1946 (R. 23 and 24). He further
testified that he was familiar with the area within a
radius of two blocks of North Temple and 2nd West
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and testified in respect
to the change of circumstances that have taken place
in that area since October, 1956. His is the only testimony on the subject and from Mr. Wirthlin, facts were
elicited concerning the motels that have been constructed since October, 1956, and the change in the
character of the neighborhood.
Since October, 1956, there have been constructed
5 motels totaling 337 rental units within a two block
radius of the subject property purchased from Jerry
Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, and in addition thereto,

8
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there has been the construction of the Harman Cafe
and two service stations. Older buildings have been
eradicated and at least one parking lot established (R.
25-34 and Exhibit 5) .
Mr. Wirthlin testified that in his opinion, there
has been a substantial change in the character of the
neighborhood surrounding the subject property (R.
33 and 34). He further testified that the property in
question would not have great utility or commercial
value except in conjunction with other properties surrounding it, this being because of the size of the parcel
of land, building restrictions imposed by City Ordinance, and parking restrictions ( R. 36 and 37) .
There being no substantial dispute of Mr. Wirthlin's testimony as to the character of the neighborhood
nor as to his qualifications as an expert giving such
testimony, it could be assumed that the trial court believed the testimony offered by the Respondent. However, even assuming that a conflict of facts existed
concerning this issue, the Court is nevertheless the
trier of this fact and its finding, when based upon substantial evidence such as that offered by the Respondent,
will not be reviewed. In support of this we cite: Gappavar v. Scheuman, 1957, 51 Wash., 2d 55, 350 P.2d 649:
"A finding of the trial court in respect to facts
proved will not be reviewed by the Supreme
Court on a legal question. In any event, the
Supreme Court will not substitute itself for the
trier of fact to determine factual matters."

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U.2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d
1073, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah said:
"The main contention upon appeal is that
there was no valid delivery of the deed in question. In reviewing this contention, we will keep
in mind the fact that the trial court found a valid
delivery. Since this is true, we will not overturn
its decision unless it is manifest that the trial
court misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence."

'' * * * We are not inclined to overturn the
:findings of the trial court when supported by
the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses,
which is unrefuted by the documentary evidence
involved, nor are we aware of any rule of law
that would permit us to do so."
In Wolff v. Fallon (Cal. Dist. Ct. of Appeal)
269 Pac. 2d 630, the Court said:
"It is well established that the right to relief
from restrictive covenants such as those herein,
depends upon the facts of each case. The findings
of the trial court in such a case are entitled to the
same weight as in any other case, and if based
on any substantial evidence, they are :final."
Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cas. 530; 258 P. 60;
Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, 207;
206 p .2d 898.
In Key v. McCabe, 356 P.2d 169, the Supreme
Court of the State of California said:
"The trial court concluded that the building
restrictions were unenforceable against Defendants' lot."

10
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"This is the sole question presented for determination: Is there substantial evidence in the
record to support the findings of fact set forth
above?n
'"'"Yes. The rule is established that when a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there
is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the
power of the appellate court begins and ends
with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.
(Primm v. Pri1nm, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 293 (1),
299 P.2d 231.)"

POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE SAID
RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
HOWEVER, SUCH A FINDING WAS NOT
NECESSARY TO THE CONCLUSION
REACHED BY THE COURT AND THAT
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THE
RESTRICTION VOIDABLE.
The language contained in the Quit-Claim Deed
and Assignment of Contract (Exhibits 1 and 7), is
subject to more than one interpretation. It could be
considered as a covenant which runs with the land or
could be considered as a personal covenant applying

11
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only to the Grantee and Assignee named therein. The
nature of the covenant can only be determined from
the intent of the parties at the time of its imposition.
Mr. A. P. Neilson testified that he himself did not
intend or desire to build a motel upon the subject premises and from such testimony, the Court could clearly
conclude that the Grantee accepted the Deed and Assignment with the full kl1owledge and understanding
that the restriction was to apply to him only and not
be binding upon his heirs, successors, or assigns (R.
22).
The covenant herein involved is somewhat akin to
the covenant contained in the case of Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419; 336 P.2d 122. In this case the
Court said:

" * * * We will not overturn its decesion unless
it is manifest that the trial court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of the evidence.
"The trial court followed the correct doctrine
that in· the construction of an uncertain or ambiguous restrictions, the courts will resolve all
doubts in favor of the free and unrestricted use
of property, and that it ·will 'have recourse to
every aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain the intention of the parties.'" "
In 26 C.J.S. 1094, Section 162 (3) it is stated:
"In construing restrictions on the use of property, the intention of the parties, as gathered
from the surrounding circumstances and the
purpose of the restriction, must be considered
12
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and given effect. Such restrictions are strictly
construed against the parties seeking to enforce
them and should not be extended by construction
or implication beyond the clear meaning of their
terms; and all doubts are resolved in favor of
the free use of property."
(See also 14 Am. J ur. 621, Section 212; 26 C.J.S.
1138, 167).

' In the instant case, the intention of the parties is
not made clear upon the face of the instrument. It is
ambiguous and uncertain and no time for its duration
is specified nor is the same specifically made binding
upon the heirs, successors, or assigns of the Grantee.
Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Sine would suggest
and indicate that he was more concerned about A. P.
Neilson as a "motel man" than any other factor (R.
51-52). Such being the circumstance, based upon the
testimony of the various witnesses, the Court could
reasonably conclude that it was the intention of the
parties that the covenant in1posed was of a personal
nature only and would expire upon the transfer and
conveyance of the interest of Mr. Neilson to a subsequent Grantee or Assignee. (See the recent case of
Smith, et al, v. Second Church of Christ, 87 Ariz. 400;
351 P.2d 1104 at Pages 1110-1111).
Regardless of the conclusion reached by the Court
with respect to this covenant being personal or one that
runs with the land, there does not exist sufficient basis
to reverse the trial court's judgment, as the covenant
fails for reasons that will be argued under Point III,
13
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and therefore the finding of the court in this regard is
not conclusive of the final determination.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
THAT MR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPELLANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHT
WHATSOEVER IN THE PROPERTY IS
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND
THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO.
The Appellants, in their Brief, have seen fit to subdivide the discussion of Point III into several subtopics. This Brief will answer each sub-topic through
a general discussion rather than make a separate discussion of each sub-topic.
In each case cited by the Appellants in support
of this Point, there appears to be a benefit running to
the exactor of the covenant. In the case before this
Court, the Appellants imposed the restriction in the
Assignment of Real Estate Contract and the QuitClaim Deed, and such restriction constitutes a detriment
upon the land of the Respondent but confers no benefit
whatever on the land of the Appellants (R. 69-96). In
fact, on Page 96 of the Record, Mr. Sine, one of the
Appellants, was asked concerning the effect of the
construction of 6 motel units as proposed by Western
Travel, Inc., on the tract of land in question:

14
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"Q. Would it materially damage or affect your
other property interests?

"A. I don't think the six units would, no."
The trial court found that there was no benefit
running to the Appellants and only a detriment to
the land of the Respondent (Finding of Fact 13, Finding of Fact 25) .. It is interesting to observe that the
Appellants have not taken an appeal from these Findings of Fact. Since there has been no appeal taken
from these Findings, the same must be considered as
admitted and certainly there is no reason for continuing
the restriction unless there is a benefit to be realized
by the Appellants.
A discussion of the law on the subject is found in
14 Am. Jur. 649, Section 305, wherein it is stated:

"The test for determining whether restrictions
imposed by deed on the use of property conveyed
should be declared by a court of equity to be
extinguished as a cloud on title has been said to
be whether the original purpose and intention
of the parties can be reasonably carried out in the
light of the materially changed conditions."
The Supreme Court of California in Hurd v.
Albert, 3 Pac. 2d 545; 76 A.L.R. 1348, which appears
to be a leading case on the subject, said on Page 1354
A.L.R.:
"We are of the opinion, after reading the
record, that the above findings are all supported
by substantial evidence, and cannot be disturbed
on appeal. Such findings are ample to sustain a
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judgment denying injunctive relief. Whatever
may be the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, the rule in this jurisdiction is well settled and the equity courts will not enforce restrictive covenants by injunction in a case where,
by reason of a change in the character of the
surrounding neighborhood, not resulting from
a breach of the covenants, it would be oppressive
and inequitable to give the restriction effect, as
where the enforcement of the covenant would
have no other result than to harass or injure
the defendants, without benefiting the plaintiff."
"And so though the contract was fair and just
when made, the interference of the court should
be denied, if subsequent events have made performance by the Defendant so onerous that its
enforcement would impose great hardship upon
him, and cause little or no benefit to the Plain,tiff."
See also Wolff v. Fallon (Supreme Court of California) 284 P.2d 802; and see also Whitmarcbv. Richmond, 20 A.2d 161; 179 Md. 523, which interprets substantial benefit. And, Barton v. Moline Properties,
121 Fla. 683; 164 Southern 551; 103 A.L.R. 725, which
establishes the doctrine of substantial benefit to the
dominant lot as a test for maintaining the restrictive
covenant.
A covenant will not be enforced if there has been
a substantial change in the character and circumstances
of the neighborhood. In the case before this Court, the
trial court found that there was a change in the character
and circumstances in the neighborhood, as discussed
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previously under Point I. We contend that the Finding
of :Fact is a factual matter which cannot be disputed
on appeal. See: 14 Am. Jur. 646, Section 302:
"A change in the character of the neighborhood which was intended to be created by restrictions has generally been held to prevent
their enforcement in equity, where it is no longer
possible to accomplish the purpose intended by
such covenant, * * * . In fact, equity may remove
restrictions as a cloud on title in such a case."
See also 14 Am. J ur. 668, Section 344; Restatement of Property, Section 539, Comment (f) ; 26 C.J .S.
1175, Section 171. Cases on this subject are: Price v.
Anderson, 358 Pa. 209; 56 A.2d 215; 2 A.L.R. 2d 593;
Sanders v. McAmmon (Oklahoma) 365 P .2d 730;
Woods v. Knox (Oklahoma) 277 P.2d 982; Wiltoff v.
Kohl (New Jersey) 147 Atl. 930; 66 A.L.R. 1317.
See also Annotations 54 A.L.R. 812; 88 A.L.R. 405;
103 A.L.R. 734, and 4 A.L.R. 2d 1111.
In the case of Price v. Anderson, cited hereinabove,
the Court there stated, in part, as fallows :
"It is an elementary principal of equity jurisprudence that such a decided change of conditions makes it improper for a Chancellor to
enforce a covenant which limits the full right of
an owner to develop his property; this is because
public policy dictates that land shall not be unnecessarily burdened with permanent or long
continued restrictions and because equity will
not retard improvements simply in order to
sustain the literal or technical observance of a
covenant which for one reason or another has
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become useless from the standpoint of any practical utility." (Cases there cited).
"Seizing upon the words 'substantial value',
Plaintiffs claim that, regardless of whatever
changes have occurred, the restrictive covenant
remains of real value to them· because it enables
them to retain the control of commercial uses as
an asset enhancing the rental and sale value of
their presently unsold property and true it is
that, if they can have the sole and unrestricted
right to erect and lease store properties on the
tracts retained by them and can prevent Defendant from erecting stores which would compete
with ·those now erected and that may hereafter
be erected on their own retained ·land, such a
monopoly might well constitute a valuable right.
But that is not the kind of value to which the
applicable principal of equity relates,. The value
referred to in the authorities is the benefit to the
owner of the dominent tenemant in the 'physical
use or enjoyment of land possessed by him.' "
A covenant is only enforceable for a reasonable
period of time where no time is specified in the restriction, which is the situation here. See 14 Am . .Jur. 484!,
Section 5. In this citation it is said:
"The duration of restrictive covenants, if not
specifically limited by the conveyances, is for a
reasonable time, considering the nature of circumstances of and the purpose of their imposition.''
·
Covenants will not be enforced after there has been
a change in the locality or neighborhood as to render
the restriction ~f little substantial value to the dominant
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lots. Here the neighborhood has changed in character,
a question of fact, and therefore, the covenant has expired through the lapse of a reasonable time. See McClintock on Equity, Page 221, Section 123; 95 A.L.R.
458; Powell on Real Property, Vol. 5, Page 216, Section 684; and Norris v. Williams, 54 A.2d 331; 4 A.L.R.
2d 1106.
A court of equity should not enforce the restriction
imposed upon the tract of land in question for the reason that the enforcement of that restriction would not
effectuate the purpose for which it was imposed. The
Appellant, Mr. Sine, testified that the purpose of the
restriction was to prevent the construction of a large
motel between 2nd and 3rd West on North Temple
Street (R. 68 )·. He further testified that the property
itself was not large enough to be of real value as a
motel site but purchased same to keep a large motel
from being developed (R. 53, 54), and later stated that
the restriction was imposed to prevent someone else
from developing a motel (R. 70). Mr. Sine testified
that he imposed the restriction on this small parcel of
land, intending that this piece of property was the
ukeyn to a motel site and would prevent a large motel
from being constructed between 2nd and 3rd West on
North Temple Street. '\Vestern Travel, Inc., plans to
construct a large motel containing between 124 to 140
units between 2nd and 3rd West on North Temple
Street whether the restriction on this small parcel is
held invalid or not (R. 83, 84). Since a large motel will
be constructed on the property surrounding the subject
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prope:rty, the purpose of the restriction c:;tnnot be
realized regardless. of the outcome of. this lawsuit. A
court of equity will not enforce the bare right of the
Appellants when it will provide 110 bepefit to them and
only impose a, detriment on the use of. the property ,by
Respondent.
Dean Pound in his discussion on covenants in 33
Harvard Law Review, beginning at Page. 171,. said:
"When the purpose of the restriction can no
longer be carried. out, the servitude comes to an
end."
The Supreme Court of Florida in Osius v. Barton,
147 So. 862; 88 .A;.L.R. 395, said:

'' ·* '* * that the general p<;>licy of the law to
dispense with .encumbrances on title shall pre' vail, where enforcement of restrictive covenants
is no longer of general usefulness, nor capable
of serving the purposes for w4ich the restrictions
were imposed~ Cl,ark on Covenants and Interests
Running, with Land, supra, ·163-165; Jackson
v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N.E. 691, 32
Am. St. Rep. 476."
See also Hurdv. Albert, supra, and Price v. Anderson,
supra.
The trial court found that the Appellants imposed
a restrict~on for the purpose of controlling and oppressing the development of the block within which
th~ property is located and to prevent competition with
their busines~ located some 3 blocl):s West of the subject
property (R. 121). The Appellant, Mr. Sine, freely
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admitted that this was his purpose in imposing the
restriction ( R. 68-70) . An agreement not to engage
in a business in competition with the Seller will only
be enforced if the restriction is reasonable and not
against public policy (36 Am. Jur. 530-531). The
Appellants did not intend to prohibit the construction
of a motel on this piece of property having only a
frontage of 40 feet on North Temple Street, because
the tract was too small to support a motel development.
Rather, their purpose was to prevent a motel from
being constructed on the property having a frontage
of approximately 288 feet on North Temple Street
between 2nd and 3rd West Street, and a bold attempt
by the Appellants to stifle and retard the development
of a large piece of property on a street that is rapidly
becoming a "motel row" in Salt Lake City, Utah, by
the use of this restriction on the small piece of property
which they considered to be the key to a large motel
development. Certainly such a restriction is unreasonable under any construction or interpretation. To
attempt to restrict the development of this large block
of property is against public policy and should not be
allowed under any circumstances. See Price v. Anderson, supra, and Hurd v. Albert, supra.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Appellants acquired this small tract of land
in question for one principal purpose, i.e., to stymie
or prevent the growth and development of the entire
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block within .which. the subject property is located,
in so far as the same could possibly be utilized for any
motel operation or similar endeavor. Appellants admit
that ,in so far as the utilization of the subject .property
for a motel is concerned, there will be no material
detriment to their .operations . and properties -locBtted
some .3 .to 4 blocks West thereof and separated by the
wide expanse of railroad tracks. and viaduct. We. therefore fail to con1prehend any valid reason for the retention of the restriction. We are of . the opinion. that a
court of equity should lend_ its assistance to permit and
make possible the normal progressive development of
the commercial district within which the subject prop..
erty is located and should not hesitate to strike down
the ;restriction herein involved.. Certainly in any event,
the restriction, if initially valid, has now elapsed and
expired by reason of the lapse of reasonable time from
the date of its imposition due to the change. and development in the neighborhood and the fact that it bestows
no benefit to Appellants. We respectfully submit that
there exists an abundanqe of competent. evidence, ·testimony, and .law to .sustain the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions. of Law for the affirmance of the Decree
rendered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
BRANT H. \VALL
Attorney for Plainti:tr-Respondent
530 J' udge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOWARD and LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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